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McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.: New Tests for Variable-Interest Loans
By Vincent Keith Schubert*
The purpose of article XV, section 1 of the California Constitution
has been consistently recognized by the courts as a protection for the
unwary and necessitous borrower. This note will examine the diminu-
tion of the protection afforded by the scheme of the California Usury
Law inherent in a recent California Supreme Court decision, McCon-
nell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,I which deals with
the role of the element of intent in a usury law violation. An examina-
tion of the California courts' traditional approach to intent and an
analysis of the supreme court's recent departure from that approach
will demonstrate the potential vulnerability of the plaintiff borrower.
McConnell contains an important holding regarding the loan period
relevant to measuring the effective rate on a variable-interest loan. It
also contains unfortunate dicta that, if followed, could greatly increase
the plaintiff borrower's difficulty in showing intent on the part of the
lender.
The litigation in McConnell involved a loan agreement which con-
tained provisions for a variable interest rate. A variable interest rate
means the rate of interest is not fixed at the time the loan is executed
but is allowed to float at different levels over the life of the loan. The
loan agreement itself should specify an external indicator to which the
interest rate is tied. For instance, in McConnell, the interest rate was
designated to be the federal "call money rate ' 2 plus a certain additional
per cent per year which varied depending on the size of the account
balance.
Two aspects of the McConnell case are relevant to the considera-
tion of the effect that the case could have on the element of intent.
First, traditional methods of calculating the amount of interest paid as
a means of determining the interest rate charged to the borrower do not
yield meaningful figures when both the period of the loan and the in-
terest rate are indeterminate. However, such interest calculations are
* B.A., 1972, Stanford University. Member, Third Year Class.
1. 21 Cal. 3d 365, 578 P.2d 1375, 146 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1978).
2. Id. at 370, 578 P.2d at 1377, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 373. The federal call-money rate is
the rate of interest which Merrill Lynch was charged for brokerage loans.
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necessary when the question at issue is the usurious character of the
interest charged.3 The trial court followed the traditional method and
came to the conclusion that the McConnells had not been charged usu-
rious interest.4 The supreme court reversed a grant of Merrill Lynch's
demurrer stating that the accepted method of averaging was inappro-
priate in the context of a variable-interest-rate loan.-
The second significant aspect of McConnell is the standard that the
court suggests as a substitute for the traditional objective test in the
determination of usurious intent. The court stated in dictum that in
situations like McConnell, the requisite intent is not present when the
lender has negotiated the agreement "in good faith and without intent
to avoid the usury law." 6 In support of this exception to the presump-
tion of intent, the court cited a line of cases dealing with the problem of
contingent interest 7 and applied the reasoning of those contin-
gent-interest cases to a loan involving variable interest. Despite some
similarities between the concepts of variable interest and contingent in-
terest, they are not economically or legally equivalent and should not
be treated as though they are interchangeable." Although the literal
language of the contingent-interest cases appears applicable to the situ-
ation in McConnell, the failure of the court in McConnell to properly
analyze the question of intent has led to the creation of a previously
undefined and ambiguous exception to the presumption of intent in
usury cases.
The Facts in McConnell
The McConnells were customers of Merrill Lynch who traded se-
curities on margin. 9 In order to facilitate trading, Merrill Lynch ad-
vanced to customers like the McConnells funds that were placed in the
customer's margin accounts. These advances, called brokerage loans,
were made under an agreement which contained the following terms:
The monthly debit in my balance account(s) shall be charged, in
accordance with your usual custom with interest at a rate which shall
3. See notes 40-51 & accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 36-39 & accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 44-51 & accompanying text infra.
6. 21 Cal. 3d at 380, 578 P.2d at 1384, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
7. Contingent interest involves a situation in which all, or a substantial portion, of the
lender's return as interest is at risk. For a discusssion, see notes 59-61 & accompanying text
infra.
8. See note 63 & accompanying text infra.
9. Margin trading is the purchase of stock where less than the full purchase price is
paid by the purchaser. The term "margin" refers to the percentage of the purchase price
which the buyer must actually give to the seller. If the buyer must pay 80% of the purchase
price, there is an 80% margin. Even though the buyer has not paid full price, he realizes
both the profit and loss on the entire block of stock which he owns.
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include the average rate paid by you on your general loans during
the period covered by such balances respectively, and any extra rate
caused by market stringency, together with a charge to cover your
credit service and facilities. 10
In computing the interest the defendant ascertained the federal
call-money rate, and added a service charge ranging between .5% per
year for debit balances over $35,000 and 1.5% per year for balances
under $10,000. At all times relevant to the suit, the McConnell's debit
balance was under $10,000, and consequently was bearing interest at a
rate of 1.5% over the call-money rate.
During the summer of 1973, the call-money rate increased to
8.25% on July 5th and 10% on September 4th. As a consequence, the
average interest charged to the plaintiffs for the period from July 5,
1973, to September 26, 1973 exceeded 10% per year." As of September
26, Merrill Lynch had applied for and received a personal property
brokers' license and the concomitant exemption from the usury law.'
2
Plaintiffs filed suit individually and on behalf of a class of all Cali-
fornia customers who maintained margin accounts with the defendant
from November 26, 1971, to September 26, 1973, and who were
charged allegedly "unlawful" interest.' 3 In ruling on the certification
of the class, the trial court made a determination that the proper class
to pursue such a suit included only those customers who had main-
tained an account with Merrill Lynch and had been charged with a rate
of interest in excess of lO%for the entireperiod of the loan.'4 When the
interest in excess of the 10% maximum that was charged to the McCon-
nells' account during the three-month period from July, 1973, to Sep-
tember, 1973, was averaged over the life of the McConnell's account,
the total interest charged was under 10%. Thus the only members of
the class with standing to bring a suit for the recovery of the usurious
10. 21 Cal. 3d at 370, 578 P.2d at 1377, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Two separate provisions
in the loan agreement led to two causes of action in McConnell. First, under the rubric
"usual custom" the defendant's policy was to add the interest owing at the end of each
month to the debit balance of the customer's account which would then bear interest in the
following month. This constitutes compounding of the interest on a monthly basis. Charg-
ing compound interest requires an express clause in the loan agreement. Id. In reversing
the order of the trial court sustaining the defendant's demurrer, the supreme court held as a
matter of law that the customer agreement was not sufficiently clear to comply with § 2 of
the usury law and that plaintiffs had succeeded in stating a cause of action for violation
thereof. Id. at 369, 578 P.2d at 1377, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 373. This issue is not relevant to the
court's consideration of the question of intent.
11. Id. at 370, 578 P.2d at 1377, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
12. See note 70 infra. The Personal Property Brokers Law is part of a complete
gridwork of statutes which grant exemptions to most institutional lenders. For a general
discussion of California's usury law, see Note, 4 Cornprehensive View of California Usury
Law, 6 Sw. U.L. REv. 166 (1974).
13. 21 Cal. 3d at 370, 578 P.2d at 1377, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
14. Id. at 371-72, 578 P.2d at 1378-79, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
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interest were those members who had opened accounts shortly before
July of 1973 and had closed their accounts shortly after September of
1973.15 The McConnells, named plaintiffs in the present action, were
not included in this class, and the court issued an order dismissing
plaintiffs' suit as both a class and an individual action.' 6
Averaging Interest under the French Case
In making the determination that interest should be averaged over
the entire period of the loan, the trial court relied on the reasoning of a
line of cases represented by French v. Guarantee Trust Co..1 7 The
French case enunciated the principle that the interest on a loan should
be averaged over the entire contemplated life of the loan agreement in
order to prevent a borrower from transforming an innocent transaction
into a usurious one by default or premature payment.' 8
In effect, under some circumstances, repayment of the principal
can be accelerated and the interest that has been assessed for the loan
to date is then judged against a decreased principal amount. The accel-
eration takes place either from prepayment by the borrower or from
some type of borrower default. In either case the contingency that re-
sults in the payment of usurious interest is an event within the control
of the borrower. The courts are consistent in stating that such control
by the borrower acts as a type of estoppel preventing the borrower from
asserting the usurious character of the loan.' 9
The cases which rely on the rule of French v. Guarantee Trust Co.
all involve situations in which compensation has been paid to the
lender in addition to the interest stated on the face of the agreement.
This additional compensation can be divided into two basic categories.
The first category includes charges on the account that represent com-
pensation for services actually rendered by the lender to the bor-
15. Id.
16. Id. at 371-72, 578 P.2d at 1378, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
17. 16 Cal. 2d 26, 104 P.2d 655 (1940).
18. Id. at 32, 104 P.2d at 658. The French case itself involved a loan agreement where
the life of the loan was expected to be approximately 10 years. The principal of the loan was
advanced to the borrower in installments but the interest was assessed from the beginning of
the loan period. Difficulties developed over the terms of the loan as well as those in a collat-
eral construction agreement. When these difficulties proved insurmountable, the loan agree-
ment was liquidated within a year, prior to the time when all of the principal had been
extended to the borrower. As a result of these developments, the interest which was assessed
for the initial year was considerably more than the 10% maximum. However, the court felt
that the borrower should not be able to take advantage of a contingency which was within
his control, namely premature payment, to alter the nature of the transaction. Id. at 26-30,
104 P.2d at 655-57.
19. Id. at 31-33, 104 P.2d 655, 657-58 (1940). See also Arneill Ranch v. Petit, 64 Cal.
App. 3d 277, 290-91, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456, 464 (1976) (citing Bush v. Sikking, 131 Cal. App.
703, 704, 21 P.2d 1013, 1013 (1933)).
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rower.20 The second category of additional compensation involves
some type of prepayment penalty or default acceleration, as was pres-
ent in the French case itself. Both types are legally chargeable to the
loan account and represent expense to the lender for the entire period
of the loan.21 Logically, such charges should therefore be averaged
over the entire loan period when making a determination as to the usu-
rious nature of the interest charged.
The facts in McConnell differ significantly from those in French.
Although borrower default in the French case led to a premature loan
repayment, the loan agreement did state a fixed term for the life of the
loan. The loan agreement in McConnell contemplated both an indefi-
nite term and an indefinite balance. The agreement in French con-
tained a fixed interest rate whereas the agreement in McConnell
contained a variable interest rate. Because of these differences the rea-
soning of the French case is extremely difficult to apply, and a variable-
interest-rate case should distinguish French.
This conclusion was reached by the California Supreme Court. In
analyzing the variable-interest-rate loan in McConnell, the supreme
court relied on the reasoning of Arneill Ranch v. Petit,22 a recent case
from the Court of Appeal for the Second District. In Arneill, Justice
Potter pointed out the underlying incompatibility of the French ration-
ale and variable interest. Justice Potter concluded that even though the
interest paid for the full term of the loan did not exceed 10% per year,
this alone did not guarantee that the loan was not usurious.23 The
Arneill court was careful to make a distinction between the type of case
represented by French and the situation wherein the amount paid dur-
ing any particular loan period exceeds 10% per year and represents
only interest for that particular loan period.2 4 For instance, in Arneill,
interest payments were to be made on a semiannual basis. When the
interest payment for one six-month period exceeded 10% per year, and
when these charges did not represent the type of surcharge present in
French, the interest paid to the lender during that single period was the
proper measure for the interest rate in determining the usurious nature
of the loan.
25
In McConnell, the supreme court approved this analysis of varia-
ble-interest-rate loans26 and adopted it in analyzing the situation in
20. Forte v. Nolti, 25 Cal. App. 3d 656, 681, 102 Cal. Rptr. 455, 471 (1971).
21. 16 Cal. 2d at 32-33, 104 P.2d at 657-58. See also Abbot v. Stevens, 133 Cal. App. 2d
242, 247-50, 284 P.2d 159, 161-63 (1955).
22. 64 Cal. App. 3d 277, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1976).
23. -Id. at 293, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
24. Id. at 289-93, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 463-66.
25. Id. at 293, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
26. 21 Cal. 3d at 376, 578 P.2d at 1381, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
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that case.27 The McConnell court stated that, in those situations when
a variable-interest-rate loan agreement provided for an indefinite, total
time period, the method of averaging utilized in the French case was
inapplicable. 28 On this basis, the supreme court reversed the trial
court's grant of the demurrer and remanded the case. 29 However, the
court felt compelled to add its views in dictum on the question of in-
tent, an issue to be considered on retrial.
Having determined that the French method of characterization
was inapplicable, and having adopted the Arneill analysis of variable-
interest-rate payments, the court had disposed of all the issues
presented on appeal. The court, however, went beyond the issues
presented and, in addition to any mathematical calculation of interest,
McConnell now adds a new dimension to usury cases by redefining the
nature of the requirement of intent as an element of a usury law viola-
tion.30 The borrower must now make an affirmative showing of a lack
of good faith under circumstances which should allow for a presump-
tion of intent. In order to understand the court's redefinition of this
element of intent, an examination of the traditional approach to this
question is necessary.
The Presumption of Intent and the Exceptions for Good Faith
The burden of proof to show the existence of the intent to exact
usurious interest rests on the party asserting the usurious character of
27. Id. at 376-77, 578 P.2d at 1381-82, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78. The court does not
specifically address the question of what is the proper method of calculating the amount of
interest in the context of a variable-interest-rate loan. This author recommends that, as a
minimum protection for the borrower, interest should be calculated on an annual basis.
When the amount of interest paid during a one-year period exceeds 10%, the borrower
should be able to take advantage of the presumption of intent when the lender consciously
accepts the excess interest.
In the alternative, when the interest payments are made periodically, the usurious char-
acter of the payment can be determined for any period by annualizing the rate. Whenever
the interest consciously accepted by the lender during any loan period exceeds 10%, the
borrower should have the advantage of the presumption.
Unfortunately, the presence of the language in regard to good faith that appears in
McConnell makes it possible to interpret that case as establishing an exception to the pre-
sumption of intent regardless of the level reached by the interest rate in a varia-
ble-interest-rate agreement. The wording of the opinion also indicates that the court
envisions an affirmative showing of a lack of good faith on the part of the lender before a
recovery will be allowed. Id. at 380, 578 P.2d at 1384, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 380. The implica-
tions of this requirement are discussed infra. See note 69 & accompanying text infra.
28. 21 Cal. 3d at 377, 578 P.2d at 1381-82, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 377. The court here is
stating the obvious. When the agreement itself is of indeterminate length there is no way in
which a total loan period can be calculated.
29. Id.
30. id. at 377-78, 578 P.2d at 1382-83, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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the transaction. 31 California courts recognized early in the history of
California's usury law that as a practical matter showing an intent to
violate the law would be an impossible burden. 32 It would require a
virtual confession from the lender as well as a showing that the defend-
ant possessed a knowledge of the law.
This harsh rule was alleviated by presuming intent when the loan
agreement itself discloses usurious terms.33 This presumption is based
on a general rule that the parties intend to do those acts that are in fact
performed. 34 If the terms of the agreement call for interest at a rate
greater than 10% per year, and the lender consciously accepts payment
of this amount, his intent in relation to the usury law per se is irrele-
vant. As expressed in Burr v. Capital Reserve Corp.:35 "Although in-
tent is an element of usury, a conscious attempt to evade the usury law
is not necessary, and usury may be found where there has been only a
conscious and voluntary taking of more than the legal rate of
interest."
36
Once an agreement is determined to be a loan transaction that
calls for more than the legal rate of interest on its face, most courts
37
and commentators38 agree that intent is presumptively established and
that any further consideration of the intent of the parties is irrelevant.
However, the presumption of intent is predicated on the existence
of a loan. In many cases, an analysis of the nature of the transaction
will be necessary in order to determine whether the transaction is a
loan or not.39 When such an analysis is necessary, inquiry into the in-
tent of the parties is not foreclosed by presumption. When the nature
of the transaction is at issue, if the parties have negotiated the agree-
ment in good faith and without intent to evade the usury law, this will
be a sufficient indication that the transaction was not a loan and there
will be no usury law liability. The concept of intent should properly be
formulated: intent to receive on money loaned, consciously and volun-
tarily, an amount of interest in excess of the statutory maximum. There
are two exceptions. The first exception involves charges which can le-
31. Sandell, Inc. v. Bailey, 212 Cal. App. 2d 920, 931, 28 Cal. Rptr. 413, 420, cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 831 (1963).
32. See Martin v. Kuchler, 212 Cal. 536, 299 P. 52 (1931).
33. Id. at 539, 299 P. at 53.
34. Maze v. Sycamore Homes, Inc., 230 Cal. App. 2d 746, 751, 41 Cal. Rptr. 338, 342
(1964).
35. 71 Cal. 2d 983, 458 P.2d 185, 80 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1969).
36. Id. at 989, 458 P.2d at 189, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
37. See, e.g., Burr v. Capital Reserve Corp., 71 Cal. 2d 983, 989, 458 P.2d 185, 189, 80
Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (1969).
38. 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1698 (3d ed. 1972);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 526, Comment b (1932); 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 1501 (1962).
39. See notes 67-78 & accompanying text infra.
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gaily and logically be averaged over the life of the loan, e.g., the type of
surcharge seen in the French case. 40 The second exception is the in-
quiry into the nature of the transaction as noted above. This inquiry
takes place in two basic situations.
First, transactions that on their face do not appear to involve a
loan or forebearance of money are condemned when an analysis of the
intent of the parties reveals that the transactions are actually usurious
loans masquerading as transactions to which the usury law does not
apply.41 Second, loans that are apparently usurious, but which involve
a substantial risk to the lender, have been condoned as being more in
the nature of speculation in a joint venture-the contingent-interest
situation.
42
In both these cases, intent serves as the vehicle for the analysis of
the transaction. However, these two situations represent the only cir-
cumstances under which the "good faith" test has been used either to
condone an apparently usurious transaction, or to condemn a transac-
tion apparently not usurious. When the transaction is concededly a
loan and there is no substantial risk to the lender the presumption ap-
plies-not the "good faith" test.
The statutory scheme of the California usury law envisions a
lender either being subject to the 10% limit of the constitutional amend-
ment or to regulation under the Financial Code.43 McConnell adds a
new dimension to a lender's defenses under a misapplication of the
"good faith" standard for intent. Except for Arneill, a case on which
the McConnell court relies heavily in its discussion of good faith, 44 in-
tent has never before been used to insulate a nonexempt lender45 from
liability for a usury law violation when the agreement in question was
clearly a loan and no extraordinary element of risk was present in the
transaction to justify an excessive rate of interest.
40. See notes 17-18 & accompanying text supra.
41. See notes 47-49 & accompanying text infra.
42. See notes 58-60 & accompanying text infra.
43. See notes 71-72 & accompanying text infra.
44. The reliance of the court can be easily inferred from the repeated references to
Arneill and from the fact that the same cases are cited by both courts. The Arneill court
makes no distinction in its use of the words "variable" and "contingent," apparently relying
on the fact that both concepts involve some element of change. However, variable interest
and contingent interest are not identical concepts. For a discussion, see notes 62-63 & ac-
companying text infra. The supreme court adopts the Arneill analysis of variable and con-
tingent interest without critical comment. See notes 22-27 & accompanying text supra.
45. A nonexempt lender is a lender without an exemption from the usury law.
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The Good Faith Test
The Nature of the Transaction
In many cases dealing with modem financial transactions, the true
nature of the agreement between the parties is difficult to determine.
Many arrangements can obscure what is in reality a loan. A purported
lease can often be a security agreement; a purported consignment can
in actuality be a conditional sale.46 Since the usury law covers only a
loan or forbearance of money,47 a lender with usurious intent could
avoid the legal maximum limitations on the rate of interest by structur-
ing a loan agreement so that it appears to be something else. The
courts have not been receptive to this type of machination.
48
The difficulty arises when an agreement that is basically a loan is
characterized as some other type of transaction. In such situations the
court should determine whether the transaction in question is a valid
lease or credit sale, or in fact, a loan. The courts examine all the facts
surrounding the agreement to determine under what circumstances
such transactions are usurious loans.
In some circumstances an examination of the agreement would
disclose that no borrower would freely enter into certain aspects of the
transaction in question. For instance, a simple loan agreement for less
than the maximum amount of interest would only be extended if the
borrower agreed to lease equipment from the lender at terms not justi-
fied in the regular course of business. When such collateral agreements
are a condition for the extension of credit, a certain percentage of the
profit to the lender under the lease agreement is actually interest that
the lender is demanding for a loan of money.
49
The focal point for such examination has become the intent of the
parties, particularly the lender. If the bargaining was done in good
faith, at arm's length, and without intent to evade the usury law, this
would be a sufficient indication that the transaction was in fact what it
purported to be.
50
Two recent cases decided prior to McConnell demonstrate this use
46. See, e.g., Burr v. Capital Reserve Corp., 71 Cal. 2d 983, 458 P.2d 185, 80 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1969).
47. Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 339, 163 P.2d 869, 871 (1945); CAL.
CONST. art. XV, § 1.
48. Boerner v. Colwell Co., 21 Cal. 3d 37, 44, 577 P.2d 200, 204, 145 Cal. Rptr. 380,384
(1978). But see Verbeck v. Clymer, 202 Cal. 557, 562-63, 261 P. 1017 (1927), where the
California court recognized the validity of the time-credit doctrine. Historically, this doc-
trine allowed a vendor of goods to establish one price for an immediate sale for cash, and a
second price where he himself was extending credit to one of his customers. This doctrine
has evolved into a general exception from the usury law for valid credit sales.
49. See, e.g., Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky, 210 Cal. 428, 292 P. 474 (1930).
50. See notes 51-57 & accompanying text infra.
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of the concept of intent as an analytical tool. In Glaire v. La Lanne-
Paris Health Spa, Inc.:51 the plaintiff urged in part that the customary
sale of contracts at a discount constituted a loan and was subject to the
limitations of the usury law. In overruling the trial court's grant of a
demurrer, the supreme court noted the analytical use of intent:
[T]he good faith of the parties is crucial to the insulation of discount
transactions from usury consideration, and good faith is ultimately a
question of fact: ". . . The courts have been alert to pierce the veil of
any plan designed to evade the usury law and in doing so to disre-
gard the form and consider the substance. . . .All of the negotia-
tions, circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding and
connected with their contracts may be material in determining whether
the form thereof covered an intent to violate the usury law .... ,,-2
This use of the concept of intent in Glaire is entirely different from
the use made of intent in McConnell. In Glaire a fairly complex
financial transaction was revealed to be a disguised loan. In
McConnell, there was no dispute about the nature of the transaction.
The parties intended a loan of money. The issue in McConnell was the
effect of the collection of interest in excess of the statutory maximum
amount.
Boerner v. Colwell Co. 53 involves the same use of intent54 demon-
strated in Glaire. In discussing the distinction between credit sales and
51. 12 Cal. 3d 915, 528 P.2d 357, 117 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1974). The borrower was the
purchaser of a seven-year membership in a health club owned by the defendant. The plain-
tiff was offered a choice of making a full payment of $408 at the beginning of the term of the
membership or of making 24 monthly payments of $17 each. Plaintiff, like most of the spa's
customers, chose to make the monthly payments. As a matter of course, the spa discounted
the note with the customer and assigned the contract to Universal Guarantee Acceptance
Corporation for $225. Universal and La Lanne are interlocking corporations and Universal
regularly assists La Lanne with financing.
52. Id. at 927, 528 P.2d at 364-65, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 548-49 (citing Milana v. Credit
Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 340-41, 163 P.2d 869, 871-72 (1945)) (emphasis added).
53. 21 Cal. 3d 37, 577 P.2d 200, 145 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
54. Colwell Co. is a mortgage banking firm which regularly assisted several construc-
tion companies whose customers wished to secure financing for construction to be per-
formed by the construction companies. Colwell would reach an agreement with the builders
outlining the circumstances under which Colwell would purchase the construction contracts
from the builder. Colwell supplied the builder with a series of forms including a credit
application, a lien contract and deed of trust, and a truth-in-lending disclosure.
When a builder using Colwell's service was contacted by a homeowner who wished to
have a construction job performed, a contract was executed by the builder and the customer.
as well as all the forms which had been supplied by Colwell. Colwell would then run a
credit check and if the results were satisfactory, Colwell would inform the builder and the
homeowner that the contract was accepted for purchase and would record the assigned lien
contract and deed of trust.
A group of homeowners who had financed construction in this way brought suit claim-
ing that the sale of the contracts at a discount constituted a loan which was subject to the
limitation of the usury law. Colwell asserted that the transaction were really valid credit
sales and not loans by Colwell in the form of assignments.
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loans, the court cited Burr v. CapitalReserve Corp.55 for the proposition
that intent is the proper focus for determining the nature of the transac-
tion.56 Although there is a split of opinion on the question of whether
the record in the case reveals a loan transaction or not, there is no disa-
greement on the question of intent, and the dissent in Boerner contains
the clearest formulation of the role of intent in analyzing the nature of
the transaction. Justice Mosk stated:
Where the form of the transaction makes it appear to be nonusuri-
ous, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the intent of the
contracting parties was that disclosed by the form adopted, or
whether such form was a mere subterfuge to conceal a usurious
transaction. . . . Thus, intent is material in determining the nature
of the transaction; but once the true nature is shown, the intent with
which the act was performed is immaterial. . . . In other words a
conscious attempt to evade the Usury Law is not necessary.51
The Hazard Rule
The second situation in which good faith has been used as an ex-
ception to the presumption of intent revolves around a contingency
which places all, or a substantial portion, of the lender's return as inter-
est at risk. In some circumstances, an entrepreneur might wish to at-
tract capital for a venture with high risk. In order to attract investors
he will have to offer a rate of return commensurate with the risk. Al-
though there are methods by which such investors could participate in
the transaction without a loan agreement, e.g, incorporation or limited
partnership, investors may not be willing to assume the formal respon-
sibilities required by these procedures. The simplest and most conve-
nient form for such a transaction to take would be for the lender-
investors to enter into a loan arrangement with the entrepreneur and to
make his high interest return contingent on the success of the enter-
prise. Such an arrangement would violate the usury law if the interest
rate were to exceed 10%.
However, usury law liability is predicated on the existence of a
loan transaction. A transaction that involves substantial risk is more
accurately characterized as a joint venture. The so-called "hazard
rule" was developed by the courts as an exception to the usury law
which was justified by the risk that the lender was willing to take. This
risk was seen as a justification for the lender's demand of more than the
legal maximum rate of interest in those situations where he was willing
to indulge in a speculative endeavor; where the investor-lender is
clearly investing as opposed to lending.
55. 71 Cal. 2d 983, 458 P.2d 185, 80 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1969).
56. 21 Cal. 3d at 44, 577 P.2d at 204, 145 Cal Rptr. at 384.
57. Id. at 58, 577 P.2d at 213, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (citations omitted).
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Unfortunately, the form the parties choose for this type of transac-
tion makes the agreement appear to be a usurious loan. In such cir-
cumstances, the courts have allowed the lender to use intent to
demonstrate the true nature of the transaction.
Typical of this situation is the case of Thomassen v. Carr.58 In that
case the lender advanced a substantial sum of money for a period of
eighteen months. The defendant was to use the money to make certain
improvements on his real property. In lieu of interest the lender was to
receive a percentage of the profit realized on the sale of the improved
property. When a sale was eventually made, the lender's portion of the
profit amounted to almost a 100% return on the lender's initial invest-
ment. However, the court determined that this "loan" was really more
in the nature of speculation, and since any interest returned to the
lender was subject to a substantial and recognizable risk, the usury law
did not apply.
The line of cases represented by Thomassen v. Carr,59 and sup-
ported by section 527 of the Restatement of Contracts,60 represents an
exception to the usury law which covers agreements designed to in-
clude this type of contingent interest. Provided that all, or a substantial
portion, of the interest return on the investment is subject to a substan-
tial risk, the parties will be deemed to have bargained in good faith and
without intent to evade the usury law.
McConnell and Good Faith
In analyzing the McConnell case, it is apparent that none of the
recognized exceptions to the usury law covers the Merrill Lynch agree-
ment. The arrangement is clearly a loan. This obviates the necessity to
use the concept of good faith to determine the form of the transaction.
58. 250 Cal. App. 2d 341, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1967).
59. See, e.g., Arneill Ranch v. Petit, 64 Cal. App. 3d 277, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1976);
Thomassen v. Carr, 250 Cal. App. 2d 341, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1967); Wooton v. Coerber. 213
Cal. App. 2d 142, 28 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1963); Schiffv. Pruitt, 144 Cal. App. 2d 493, 301 P.2d
446 (1956); Miley Petroleum Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 18 Cal. App. 2d 182, 63
P.2d 1210 (1936); Lamb v. Herndon, 97 Cal. App. 193, 275 P. 503 (1929); Jameson v. War-
ren, 91 Cal. App. 590, 267 P. 372 (1928).
60. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 527 (1932) provides: "A promise, made as the con-
sideration for a loan or for extending the maturity of a pecuniary debt, to give the creditor a
greater profit than the highest permissible rate of interest upon the occurrence of a condi-
tion, is not usurious if the repayment promised on failure of the condition to occur is materi-
ally less than the amount of the loan or debt with the highest permissible interest, unless a
transaction is given this form as a colorable device to obtain a greater profit than is permissi-
ble. In that case it is usurious." The Arneill court cites Thomassen v. Carr for the proposi-
tion that Restatement § 527 states the law in California. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 289, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 463. Note, however, that this section has been deleted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977).
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Under the rationale of the Burr case,6' Merrill Lynch's intent vis- -vis
the usury law should be presumed as there is no issue as to whether
Merrill Lynch intended to accept an amount of interest in excess of the
legal maximum. This intent can be inferred from the actual collection
of interest under the terms of the loan agreement.
The only other well defined exception from the usury law is the
hazard rule, necessary in contingent-interest cases. However, the
agreement in the McConnell case involved variable interest. The fac-
tors to which a trier of fact should look to interpret the agreement in
contingent-interest cases are not present in a variable-interest case.
Contingent interest cannot be equated, economically or legally, with
variable interest.
The concept of contingent interest requires that the lender assume
a certain amount of the risk in consideration for a potential rate of
return enhanced beyond the statutory maximum. Allowing a borrower
to enter into an agreement calling for contingent interest and, then
when the enterprise succeeds beyond all expectation, allowing him to
subject the lender to the penalties involved in a violation of the usury
law would be unfair.
Variable interest, on the other hand, contains no element of risk.
It is simply an attempt to tie the rate of return on a loan to an objective
economic indicator that reflects with reasonable accuracy a reasonable
rate of return. The object of a variable-interest-rate loan is not to pro-
vide for an unexpected contingency but to allow the interest rate to
reflect inflationary or deflationary pressure without a necessity to refi-
nance and thereby guarantee to the lender a profit on the transaction.
This device would be particularly useful in situations like that in
McConnell when both the amount of the loan and the period of the
loan are indefinite. Variable interest is an economically feasible alter-
native to the normal fixed-rate loans62 but bears no relation to contin-
gent interest. Unlike contingent interest, which involves high risk,
variable interest is designed to eliminate the uncertainty caused by in-
flation. Therefore, the court's reliance on the Thomassen line of cases
as support for a good-faith exception for a variable-interest-rate loan is
misplaced.
In effect, the court has now added another good faith exception to
the presumption of intent. No previously defined exception covers a
variable-interest-rate loan that rises above 10%. The standards for such
61. See notes 35-38 & accompanying text supra.
62. The California Civil Code already provides statutory standards and requirements
for variable-interest-rate loans in real estate mortgages. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1916.5
(West Supp. 1979). For a discussion of their uses and advantages, see Comment, The Varia-
ble Interest Rate Clause and Its Use in Calfar/a Real Estate Transactions, 19 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 468 (1972).
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an exception are not well defined in McConnel.63
The court finds support for its holding in what it calls "practical
good sense."' 64 It recognizes that a strict construction of the usury law
confronts a lender in Merrill Lynch's position with a difficult choice. 65
When the amount that the lender must pay in order to obtain funds to
advance to its customers rises above 10% per year, the lender must
choose between advancing money at rates below cost or calling in its
margin loans. The court is clearly sympathetic to Merrill Lynch, going
so far as to state gratuitously that the documents before it on appeal
appear consistent with good faith.
66
However, the reasoning of the court in its analysis of good faith
entirely lacks case support. The cases cited in McConnell involve facts
that are distinguishable to the point of irrelevancy. 67 None of the ele-
ments of risk of the contingent-interest cases, which justify an excessive
rate of interest, will be present in a variable-interest-rate case.68 The
court has provided no guidance for determining the reasonable nature
of the indicator selected by the parties, the effect of a relative disparity
in bargaining power, or the weight to be given other factors in the con-
text of a variable-interest-rate loan. The court should not create a new
exception for lenders by relying on a line of cases that does not provide
any guidance for the trier of fact to assess the grounds on which such
an exception is to be judged.
Furthermore, Merrill Lynch had several options that it could have
exercised in order to protect itself from a usury law violation. That
they failed to do so could reasonably be taken as a demonstration of
the necessary intent. A simple 10% cap could have been placed on its
loan stating that should the indicator plus the surcharge rise above 10%
63. In an attempt to justify its position, the court felt constrained to point out that the
benefits of a variable-interest-rate loan inure to the borrower as well as the lender. This
statement assumes that the loan agreement contains an indicator similar to those used in real
estate mortgages under the Civil Code. The Code requires that the variable-interest-rate
clause in the mortgage must allow the interest rate to be decreased when the indicator drops
as well as increased when the indicator rises. This requirement was necessary to protect
mortgagors from escalator clauses, which only allow the interest rate to move up. Would the
court find that such a clause did not comport with good faith? In addition, given the level of
the inflationary pressure to which the economy has been subject in recent years, the benefits
to the borrower which the court notes may be more illusory than real.
In defending variable-interest-rate loans the court seems to lose sight for a moment of
the fact that the issue in the case is not the validity of the agreement but the effect of the
collection of interest in excess of the legal maximum. Whether variable interest represents
an advantage for the borrower is not relevant to the question of whether Merrill Lynch is
guilty of usury.
64. 21 Cal. 3d at 378, 578 P.2d at 1382, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
65. -d.
66. Id.
67. See notes 59-63 & accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 58-60 & accompanying text supra.
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interest would be collected at a rate of 10% per year rather than the
higher figure. A more liberal ceiling could be placed on a varia-
ble-interest-rate loan by relying on the one-year period expressed in
the constitution. If, at any time, the interest rate for the preceding one
year exceeded 10%, interest would be limited by a 10% ceiling until the
indicator plus the surcharge fell below 10% for the previous one-year
period.6
9
An additional factor which reduces the necessity which the court
apparently felt for establishing a new exception to the usury law is that
the extensive scheme of exemptions for certain institutional lenders al-
ready includes lenders situated in Merrill Lynch's position. Merrill
Lynch could easily have qualified for a personal property brokers' li-
cense at any time and thereby been exempt from the usury law. Obvi-
ously, as long as the call-money rate plus the surcharge was below 10%,
there was no reason for Merrill Lynch to subject itself to the regulation
of the Personal Property Brokers Law.70 However, once the rate did
begin to approach the limit, Merrill Lynch should have opted for the
license. In fact, shortly after the rate did exceed 10%, Merrill Lynch
applied for and received a license.
71
In the period between the time when interest exceeded 10% and
the issuance of the license, Merrill Lynch should have returned the ex-
cess interest collected or suffered liability for violating the usury law.
This choice is mandated by the language of article XV, section 1 of the
constitution. When a lender wishes to loan money he should be faced
with the necessity of having his loan comply with the 10% limit of the
constitution or with applying for a license and having his loan regu-
lated under an appropriate section of the Financial Code. The
McConnell court has now given a lender the additional option of re-
maining unregulated and relying on the nebulous good faith standard
to insulate him from the usury law. This new option, coupled with the
added difficulty the borrower now faces in proving his case, makes it
possible that numerous lenders who should be forced under the regula-
tion of the Financial Code will now choose to rely on the good faith of
their negotiations. Despite what the court sees as the injustice of sub-
jecting Merrill Lynch to liability under the usury law, such a solution is
preferable to allowing a nonexempt lender (Merrill Lynch's status prior
to receipt of the personal property brokers' license) to operate without
69. The court of appeal in Arneill pointed out that this situation did exist in fact in that
case. However, after noting some confusion over the issue of characterization of interest
payments, the 4rneill court chose to dispose of the case on the same basis that the supreme
court adopted in McConnell. Arneill Ranch v. Petit, 64 Cal. App. 3d 277, 282-83, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 456, 459-60 (1976).
70. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22000-22653 (West 1968).
71. 21 Cal. 3d at 370, 578 P.2d at 1377, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
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any restraint on the amount of interest which can be charged other than
a nebulous and unsupported standard of good faith. As varia-
ble-interest-rate loans become a more significant factor in consumer
transactions, borrowers dealing with nonexempt lenders in nonexempt
transactions should not be deprived of the protection of the usury law.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most damaging consequence of the McConnell deci-
sion is the effect that its dictum will have on the plaintiff borrower's
ability to successfully prove a usury law violation. The McConnell case
now places any borrower whose loan transaction contains a varia-
ble-interest-rate clause in the same impossible position the objective-
intent presumption was designed to alleviate.72 In order to prove his
case, the borrower must now obtain evidence of intent which the courts
have repeatedly recognized is all but unobtainable.
The imposition of this burden contravenes the strong public policy
of California against usury. The language of the Constitution states
that in the absence of an exemption "[n]o person, association, copart-
nership or corporation shall. . . receive from a borrower more than 10
percent per annum upon any loan or forbearance of any money, goods
or things in action. ' '73 If a trial court were now to follow the dictum in
McConnell and impose the burden of proof on the question of intent
on the plaintiff borrower, that burden would represent a significant in-
fringement of the constitutional protection afforded California borrow-
ers by the usury law.
The McConnell dictum is particularly open to criticism in that it is
unnecessary for the court to create an exception from the usury law in
order to relieve the economic pressure on Merrill Lynch. The Finan-
cial Code already contains perfectly satisfactory provisions in the Per-
sonal Property Brokers Law which cover lenders in Merrill Lynch's
position. A protection for California borrowers that is constitutional in
stature should be circumvented only with extreme care and under ex-
traordinary circumstances. It should certainly not be weakened based
on a dubious analogy to an irrelevant line of cases no matter how much
"practical good sense" can be found to support one side of the case.
72. See notes 31-37 & accompanying text supra.
73. CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
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